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PREDICTING THREATS ON ELECTRONIC HEALTH 
RECORD SYSTEMS 
 
Jason E. Nelms 





Security is a key concern in the development of electronic health record (EHR) systems. This paper considers Neutralization 
Theory and the Fear Appeals Model in proposing a conceptual model for use in predicting breach behaviors within EHR 
systems. The goal of the model is to determine which factors influence security breach intent on the part of the offender. 
Specifically, perceived penalty, perceived evasiveness, awareness of opportunity, enforcement, and user participation are 
proposed to act as antecedents to security breach intent, a surrogate for actual breach behavior.  
Keywords 
Electronic health records, security, neutralization, fear appeals 
INTRODUCTION 
The quantity of health data stored in electronic form continues to grow at an exponential rate, and recent healthcare 
legislation calls for nationwide electronic health records (EHRs) by 2014 (Thielst, 2007). The tremendous growth mandated 
by this legislation, coupled with technological advances such as telemedicine (Dwivedi et al., 2007), creates a need for tools 
which facilitate the use and management of the records.  
As with other technologies, rapid growth in EHR tools presents a number of issues that must be addressed. One of the 
primary issues currently facing EHR management is that of security (Hewitt, 2010), with threats on EHR systems originating 
both within and outside of the systems. This paper focuses on internal threats, specifically those enacted by users of an EHR 
system. Reflecting upon two information security theories – neutralization theory and the fear appeals model (FAM), I create 
a conceptual model for predicting security breaches within an EHR system. The proposed model examines security breach 
intent from the perspective of offender (i.e. actor) contemplating a system breach.  
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Prior to the development of the conceptual model discussed in this paper, a thorough review of relevant literature is first 
provided. This review takes place within two primary streams: healthcare information technology (placing a specific focus on 
EHRs and EHR systems) and information systems security (ISS). This section outlines the relevant literature present within 
each stream with the aim of justifying constructs within the hybrid model. 
EHR Literature 
In considering legislation enacted during the previous two presidential terms, one is not surprised to see that most of the EHR 
literature examines the current state of EHR usage. Although EHRs have existed in some format since the 1960s (Lincoln et 
al., 1993), focus on the importance of EHR systems has only recently become urgent. However, only one in five members of 
the Medical Group Management Association claimed to be using EHRs as late as 2008 (Swartz, 2008). Also, the 
aforementioned call for EHRs and the popularity of such records among United States (U.S.) citizens have not prompted 
much action on the part of the U.S. government. The government has failed to make adequate strides to enforce healthcare 
initiatives that would likely quicken the conversion process from paper-based records to EHRs (Swartz, 2007).  
Current research on EHRs has begun to explore issues related to implementation and technology concerns. Hewitt (2010) 
explores the many obstacles faced as organizations implement EHR systems, including staff resistance, increased costs, and a 
plethora of security issues. Boaden and Joyce (2006) posit that the process of change from a paper-based to an integrated 
EHR system must be viewed within the context of governance and patient safety in order to yield an effective system. While 
Sherer (2010) examines the role of mimetic forces on EHR adoption, Hennington et al. (2009) investigate mandated EHR 
systems, a concept of increasing relevance due to mandates within recent healthcare legislation.  
Dwivedi et al. (2007) discuss the future of telemedicine, a technology that will use electronic exchange to allow patients to 
carry out routine medical testing through streaming or delayed data transfers. The technology, which is likely to emerge as an 
alternative medium for healthcare over the next 10-15 years, has the potential to reduce office visits, an outcome that, if 
Nelms  Predicting Threats on EHR Systems 
 
Proceedings of the Southern Association for Information Systems Conference, Atlanta, GA, USA March 25th-26th, 2011 132 
realized, would reduce the cost of routine consultations with physicians. Thielst (2007) furthers the discussion of electronic 
exchange as he proposes more efficient EHR delivery method, namely virtual health records (VHRs), a type of record which 
enables practitioners to access a patient’s entire health history from within a web portal. VHRs have the potential to interact 
with telemedicine technologies to have a major impact on the development of EHRs on a worldwide basis. 
IS Security Literature 
Siponen and Vance (2010) bring Neutralization Theory, one of the primary focuses in this paper’s contribution, into the 
context of IS. They propose that neutralization theory, a theory prominent in Criminology, can provide compelling 
explanations of the motivational factors behind IS security breaches and should be considered in the development and 
implementation of IS security policies. More on this study will be included in the model formation of this paper.  
In related literature, Bulgurcu et al. (2010) find that an employee’s intention to comply with an information security policy is 
influenced by attitude, outcome beliefs, and self-efficacy to comply. Outcome beliefs significantly affect beliefs about 
consequences, which, in turn, affect employee attitude. As a precursor, information security awareness (ISA) positively affect 
both attitude and outcome beliefs. Conversely, fear-inducing arguments, known as fear appeals, do not impact user behavior 
intentions (Johnston and Warkentin, 2010). For this reason, this paper functions on the assumption that the individual 
targeting a system has a strong ISA, being fully aware of the existence and implementation of security measures within and 
surrounding the targeted EHR system. Also, like Ransbotham and Mitra (2009), this study also considers the roles of 
countermeasures as a factor within the offender’s consideration of the perceived penalty involved in a security breach.  
Smith et al. (2010) study the effect of mandatory compliance to information security standards, an aspect of new healthcare 
legislation that has been enacted, but not recently enforced by government agencies in the U.S. (Swartz, 2006). Due to this 
lack of activity, it is difficult to determine the number of breaches that occur on a regular basis although recent literature has 
shown that this number remains high, with an alarming 50% of U.S. hospitals affected by breaches in 2009 (Information 
Management Journal, 2009a). With the help of legislation such as The HITECH Act, a part of the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act of 2009, these numbers should decrease, however, as stiffer penalties can now be applied to those found in 
violation of health information standards, namely HIPAA. This type of mandatory compliance is a key issue in the model 
detailed in the next section. 
CREATING A HYBRID MODEL FOR BREACH PREDICTION 
As previously stated, the goal of this paper is to create a conceptual model that incorporates the original FAM framework, 
taking into consideration neutralization variables. The original FAM model developed by Johnston and Warkentin (2010) 
explained user intentions to engage in individual computer security actions recommended through fear-inducing persuasive 
communication. Neutralization Theory (Siponen and Vance, 2010) describes several justification techniques undertaken by 
offenders to displace the blame or responsibility they face when planning or enacting a breach. The model represented in 
Figure 2 modifies the Johnston and Warkentin’s (2010) FAM while inserting into each modified construct justification 
techniques utilized by Siponen and Vance (2010). Each theory is detailed below to provide a context for the development of 
the Breach Predictor Model (BPM) for ISS breach activities. 
Fear Appeals Model (FAM) 
In the original FAM model proposed by Johnston and Warkentin (2010), the authors asserted that response- and self-efficacy 
mediated the influence of threat severity and threat susceptibility on behavioral intent. They ultimately concluded that fear 
appeals did not have an effect on a user’s activity as it pertained to the adoption of proposed security measures. Johnston and 
Warkentin concluded that Perceived Threat Susceptibility (a user’s basic awareness of a threat) had no significant influences 
on other constructs. As such, this study tests the same concept from the point of view of one committing a breach, aptly 
applying to it the label of Perceived Evasiveness. 
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From Johnston and Warkentin, 2010            From Siponen and Vance (2010) 
Figure 1. Fear Appeals Model (FAM) and Neutralization 
As illustrated in Figure 1, Perceived Penalty and Perceived evasiveness, constructs chosen to act as opposites of the FAM 
constructs of Perceived Threat Severity and Perceived Threat Susceptibility are hypothesized to directly affect security 
breach intent, assuming that an information security policy has been put into place. 
Neutralization Theory 
Siponen and Vance (2010) found all of the antecedents to neutralization to be significant. They also found the construct of 
neutralization to be significant in influencing one’s intention to violate IS policy (see Figure 1). In other words, the denial 
factors (justification techniques) surrounding neutralization increase an actor’s intentions to violate an ISS policy. Thus each 
of the antecedents should be considered in the development of a conceptual model. These elements are common activities 
undertaken by individuals involved in rule-breaking in order to relieve themselves of fault. The six significant actions found 
in the Neutralization Theory results are as follows: defense of necessity, appeal to higher loyalties, condemning the 
condemners, invoking the metaphor of the ledger, denial of injury and denial of responsibility. 
Siponen and Vance (2010) reference prior literature to define the six significant denial factors. Defense of necessity involves 
justification on the premise that rule-breaking is necessary. Appealing to higher loyalties is typically manifested in an appeal 
to organizational values or hierarchies as a justification for committing a breach. Condemning the condemners means placing 
the blame for an action on its target. When invoking the metaphor of the ledger, an offender attempts to justify deviant act 
(e.g., an ISS breach) by claiming that offsets a series of previous positive actions. Denial of injury is simply the denial that 
harm has occurred. Finally, denial of responsibility happens when a person claims to lack control over his or her actions. 
A Proposed Conceptual Model 
The model represented in Figure 2 extends Johnston and Warkentin’s (2010) model and inserts into each adapted construct 
the significant justification techniques utilized by Siponen and Vance (2010). The following subsections detail each of the 
constructs contained within the BPM. Each subsection discusses relationships between BPM constructs and those contained 
within the neutralization mode. Additionally, each subsection provides the hypothesized relationships between the construct 
and others within the model. The descriptions proceed from the left of the model (User Participation) to Security Breach 
Intent, the model’s dependent variable and proposed surrogate for breach behavior. 
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Figure 2. Proposed Breach Predictor Model (BPM) 
User Participation 
Wiant (2005) states that despite stringent security measures, an information security policy reaches its full effective potential 
only when breaches are reported along with their degree of seriousness. As part of this process, adequate participation on the 
part of users is an important factor in mitigating risks within the system (Spears and Barki, 2010).  
Spears and Barki (2010) concluded that user participation is a key element in the successful development and implementation 
of information security policies. For the purposes of this model, user participation, typically stems from training in a system’s 
use. Thus, the construct serves as a possible antecedent to user system efficacy, reporting tendencies, and enforcement, all of 
which will be described below. Within an EHR system, user participation can be used to prepare a potential offender to 
utilize one of the six neutralization actions in breach behavior, specifically appeal to higher loyalties and metaphor of the 
ledger, as the user’s participation in system development could possibly encourage a sense of responsibility or entitlement on 
the part of a potential actor. In relation to user participation, the following propositions emerge: 
P1a: User Participation positively affects awareness of opportunity 
P1b: User Participation positively affects enforcement 
Enforcement 
The only effective information security policy is one that is consistently and fully enforced (Swartz, 2007). It is important to 
clarify the difference between government mandate and enforcement as they apply to the BPM. The mandated changes 
detailed within the review of EHR and ISS literature are the basis for government mandate. The systems described within this 
paper are only required by law. Enforcement outside of the mandate is seen as a continual follow-up measure. As stated 
above, recent literature has shown a lack of enforcement on the part of government agencies as they pertain to mandated 
healthcare legislation enforcement (Swartz, 2006b). As a result, many breaches have gone unreported and unenforced, thus 
skewing the number of actual breaches versus breaches reported over a number of time periods. Lack of adequate 
enforcement of ISS policies and government legislation are predicted to lessen the actor’s perception of the impact of a 
breach activity on himself/herself or others. Additionally, lacking enforcement prompts the actor to perceive an increase 
chance of committing the crime without being caught or punished. Thus, the proposed propositions regarding the effect of 
enforcement on perceived penalty and perceived evasiveness are as follows: 
 P2a: Enforcement positively affects perceived penalty 
 P2b: Enforcement negatively affects perceived evasiveness 
A test of these propositions will clarify the effect of community and government enforcement on a potential attacker’s 
perception of potential impact and penalty, as well as his or her ability to commit a breach undetected. 
Awareness of Opportunity, Perceived Penalty, and Perceived Evasiveness 
As this paper operates under the assumption that only intentional breaches can have pre-meditation antecedents, the potential 
actor’s awareness of a breach opportunity must be taken into consideration. Based on Johnston & Warkentin’s (2010) model, 
it is proposed that an actor, once aware of a possible breach opportunity, establishes a set of beliefs pertaining to his or her 
ability to successfully carry out a security breach and escape undetected. This idea, termed perceived evasiveness in this 
study, is closely related to the neutralization activities of invoking the metaphor of the ledger, denial of injury, and denial of 
responsibility, as each activity is aimed at relieving the offender from blame (Siponen & Vance, 2010).  
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As indicated in Figure 2, the following propositions provide a basis for the testing of the construct as an antecedent to other 
constructs within the BPM, and as a distal precursor to security breach intent.  
 P3a: Awareness of opportunity positively affects perceived evasiveness 
 P3b: Awareness of opportunity positively affects security breach intent 
 P3c: Awareness of opportunity positively affects perceived penalty 
As this paper operates under the assumption that only intentional breaches can have pre-meditation antecedents, the potential 
actor’s awareness of a breach opportunity must be taken into consideration. Johnston & Warkentin’s (2010) FAM posits that 
an individual, once aware of a threat, establishes beliefs as to the seriousness of the threat and probability of personally 
experiencing the threat. The perceived evasiveness and perceived penalty constructs within this model approach these beliefs 
from a different angle. Essentially, it is proposed that an actor, once aware of a possible breach opportunity, establishes a set 
of beliefs pertaining to his or her ability to successfully carry out an undetected security breach. This idea, termed perceived 
evasiveness in this study, is closely related to the neutralization activities of invoking the metaphor of the ledger, denial of 
injury, and denial of responsibility, as each activity is aimed at relieving the offender from blame (Siponen & Vance, 2010).  
As previously discussed, an actor typically considers possible penalties and impacts prior to conducting a breach within a 
system. In a healthcare setting, these penalties may come in the form of impacts in the care received by patients. 
Simultaneously, the actor’s perceived penalty can also be viewed as the severity of punishment that the actor expects to 
confront when caught. The construct of  Perceived Penalty is used in this study as part of an assumption that those attempting 
to make a breach have considered the possible impacts of a system breach on themselves and others.  
The construct of Perceived Evasiveness refers to the actor’s perception of his or her ability to refrain from being caught by 
the proper authorities. In other words, the stronger the perceived evasiveness felt by the potential actor, the more he or she 
feels that the breach can be committed. In their original FAM model, Threat is a construct defined as an external stimulus that 
exists whether or not it is perceived by an individual (Johnston & Warkentin, 2010). The BPM model uses Perceived 
Evasiveness as the actor’s perception of his or her ability to be an invisible threat. 
It is proposed that Perceived Penalty be tested as a variable directly influencing security breach intent as well as a moderator 
between Perceived evasiveness and Security breach intent. Therefore, the following propositions become apparent: 
 P4a: Perceived penalty negatively affects security breach intent 
P4b: Perceived penalty negatively affects perceived evasiveness  
 P5a: Perceived evasiveness negatively affects perceived penalty 
 P5b: Perceived evasiveness positively affects security breach intent  
 
As seen in P4a, it is proposed that perceived penalty negatively affects security breach intent. In other words, the higher the 
severity of penalty perceived by the actor, the less likely he or she is to possess the lower his or her security breach intent. 
Additionally, it is proposed that as the actor’s perception of perceived evasiveness increases, his or her perception of 
perceived penalty will decrease. Finally, it is proposed that an increase in the actor’s perceived evasiveness will increase his 
or her security breach intent. 
Security Breach Intent 
Security breach intent is the potential actor’s intent to commit a security breach within an EHR system. As used in the theory 
of planned behavior (Ajzen, 1991) and theory of reasoned action (Ajzen and Fishbein, 1980), behavior intent acts as a 
surrogate to actual behavior. Following this pattern, security breach intent performs similarly, acting as a surrogate to the act 
of committing a breach. The construct also mirrors Siponen and Vance’s (2010) intention to violate ISS policy. As seen in the  
BPM, all of the constructs within the model are proposed antecedents to security breach intent.  
LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
This paper provides a conceptual model to predict security breach intent within the context of HER systems based on FAM 
(Johnston and Warkentin, 2010) and Nuetralization Theory. Therefore, it only assesses variables related to the intent to 
commit a breach, although the six neutralization activities are potential variables of justification. Nevertheless, the model 
does not take into account those variables present during the mitigation stages of a breach. 
Another limitation is that this research studies intentional breaches, specifically those behavioral antecedents that lead to 
security breach intent, the construct used in this paper as a surrogate for the action of a breach. Further research should 
explore the combination of intentional and unintentional breaches and proper measures to minimize each. Such a study 
would, however require that the assumption that all breaches are planned be discarded. 
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Lastly, this paper focuses on EHR systems that have been mandated by governing powers. These types of systems have been 
chosen for this study due to the current state of their implementation. Such a transformation is a huge undertaking that is 
likely to warrant much attention from researchers and practitioners for years to come. As EHR systems become more 
prevalent, the relevance of this research should also continue to increase. 
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